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DOJ, FTC and FERC Electric Power Merger
Enforcement: Are There Too Many Cooks in the
Merger Review Kitchen?
Milton A. Marquis*

I. INTRODUCTION

Electric utility mergers in the United States are subject to review not
only from a federal antitrust agency-either the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) or the Department of Justice (DOJ)-but must also
obtain approval from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC). As I will discuss, the federal antitrust agencies and the FERC
operate under different statutes and regulatory regimes. Shared federal
merger jurisdiction between sectoral regulators and competition
authorities is strictly an American phenomenon. In the rest of the
world, the competition agency almost always reviews transactions
involving every industry sector.
Shared merger enforcement increases transaction costs and regulatory
uncertainty. In light of these additional costs, I pose the simple
question: Do the benefits of having two federal agencies review the
same transaction outweigh the costs? In other words: Are there too
many (or one too many) cooks in the regulatory review kitchen? This
issue has prompted a fair amount of recent discussion among
commentators, and there has been a recent legislative proposal
introduced by Joe Barton, the chairman of the Energy and Air Quality
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, to
1
eliminate FERC's merger review authority.
After a great deal of thought, I have concluded that having two
federal agencies review the same transaction for possible harm to
competition can no longer be defended. And, for the reasons that I will
explain, evaluating the competitive aspects of electric utility mergers
should be left exclusively to one of the federal antitrust agencies, the
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1. Electric Supply and Transmission Act, H.R. 3406, 107th Cong. §141 (2001).
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federal entities that are responsible for examining mergers in almost
every other segment of the American economy.
II. STATUTORY AUTHORITY
FERC derives its authority to review mergers involving electric
utilities from section 203 of the Federal Power Act, which reads in part:
No public utility shall sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of the whole of
its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission ...without
first having secured an order of the Commission authorizing it to do
so.... [I]f the Commission finds that the proposed... [transaction]
2
will be consistent with the public interest, it shall approve the same.
Merger applicants bear the burden of proving that their transaction is
consistent with the public interest. Until recently, the FERC examined
six nonexclusive factors, commonly referred to as the Commonwealth
Edison factors:
I. the merger's likely effect on operating costs and rate levels of the
combined company;
2. the merger's effect on competition;
3. the reasonableness of the purchase price;
4. whether the acquiring firm coerced the to-be-acquired firm into
acceptance of the merger;
5. the merger's effect on federal and state regulation; and
3
6. the contemplated accounting treatment of the merged entity.
In light of the unmistakable trend to competition in the electric power
industry, FERC wisely revised its merger policy by adopting the4
substance of the merger guidelines of the federal antitrust agencies.
The current FERC merger policy generally limits FERC's review to a
merger's effect on competition, rates and regulation, with the effect on
competition constituting the most critical of these factors.
The federal antitrust enforcement agencies enforce section 7 of the
Clayton Antitrust Act, which outlaws acquisitions of assets or stock the
effect of which "may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to
create a monopoly." 5 The government, when seeking to challenge a
merger under the Clayton Act, must file a civil action in federal district
court. As the plaintiff, the government also bears the burden of proving

2. 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a) (2000).
3. In re Commonwealth Edison Co., 36 F.P.C. 927 (1966).
4. Inquiry Concerning the Commission's Merger Policy Under the Federal Power Act, Order
No. 592, 77 F.E.R.C. 61,263, 1996 FERC LEXIS 2367 (1996).
5. 15 U.S.C. §18 (2000).
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that a transaction is likely to harm competition. In the FERC process,
however, merger applicants bear the burden of demonstrating in an
administrative proceeding that the transaction is consistent with the
public interest.
The following chart summarizes several of the key differences
between the FERC merger review process ("regulatory approach") and
the merger review process of the federal antitrust agencies ("law
enforcement approach").
FERC (Regulatory) vs. DOJ/FTC (Law Enforcement)
FERC
Relies upon parties merger
application for information
No subpoena power

Interested parties may intervene

DOJ/FTC
HSR filing alerts agencies to larger
transactions and possible
competitive problems
Can issue "second requests" to
parties and CIDs to nonparties
compelling testimony, documents,
answering of interrogatories under
oath
No formal role for interested parties

Confidential treatment of
information the exception rather
than the rule
Can reject mergers

HSR and CID materials subject to
strict confidentiality

Applicants bear burden of proving
transaction is consistent with the
public interest

Government bears the burden of
proving that the merger will
substantially lessen competition

Must go to court to block mergers

As the chart illustrates, a major difference between the two processes
is that under the regulatory approach, the sectoral regulator does not
have the power to compel information from third parties and is thus
dependent on the application of the merger partners and voluntary
submissions of third party interveners for information. By contrast,
Congress has provided federal antitrust enforcers with the tools to
compel third parties, such as customers and competitors of the merger
partners, to produce documents and testify under oath. Information
from these sources, particularly customers, is invaluable to antitrust
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enforcers. Merger review is fact intensive, and FERC's lack of
investigative tools hampers its ability to obtain the information it needs.
As the Federal Trade Commission staff explained:
Merger analysis under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is by its
nature an information-intensive task once a preliminary analysis
reveals a potential for anticompetitive effects. Many important
questions about the competitive effects of mergers are best answered
with documents, interviews, and data from many sources. The
evolution of our Horizontal Merger Guidelines reflects an expanded
consideration of facts and approaches. FERC may be better able to
protect the public interest as it reviews proposed mergers in the
rapidly changing electric industry by revising its informationgathering process to more closely match
the information requirements
6
of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
Another key distinction between the two approaches is the strict
confidentiality protections afforded information provided to the
government under the law enforcement approach. Under the regulatory
approach, in contrast, a presumption against confidential treatment of
information exists. Firms have a legitimate interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of sensitive business information. Although the FERC
in recent years has become more sensitive to the need to maintain the
confidentiality of sensitive company information, the fact remains that
the regulatory approach relies a great deal upon the participation of
interveners. Thus, in order to ensure that merger applicants are afforded
due process, the FERC is not in a position to afford the same levels of
confidentiality to sensitive business information as the federal antitrust
agencies. In addition to the harm to a firm's business of disclosure of
sensitive company documents, the public dissemination of sensitive
information can harm competition. As a long line of Supreme Court
cases recognizes, the exchange of competitively sensitive information
among competitors such as pricing data can adversely affect
7
competition by facilitating the coordination of pricing.
III. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF SHARED JURISDICTION
Although it is clear, in my view, that the law enforcement approach
of the federal agencies is the superior means of evaluating the likely
competitive effects of a proposed transaction, there are strong
arguments in favor of FERC review of electricity mergers. Probably the
6. Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission, 18
C.F.R. Part 33, Revised Filing Requirements, FERC Docket No. RM98-4-000 (1998), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/be/v980022.htm (citations omitted).
7. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969).
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strongest argument is that FERC unquestionably has superior
knowledge of the electric power industry by virtue of its oversight of
transmission and wholesale electric generation markets. Supporters of
FERC jurisdiction can also point to the fact that FERC evaluates market
power in connection with applications by incumbent utilities to sell
power at market based rates. 8 This analysis, supporters argue, is similar
to the analysis the agencies perform in the merger review process.
Supporters of FTC and DOJ merger enforcement can argue, on the
other hand, that both agencies have attorneys and economists with many
years of experience in the electricity industry. In addition, the agencies
frequently examine mergers in other network industries such as
telecommunications that share many of the characteristics of the
electricity industry. That said, the expertise of the antitrust agencies
with respect to this industry does not compare to that of the FERC.
Another argument made by proponents of FERC merger jurisdiction
is that the public interest standard is more appropriate for industries that
are in transition from pervasive regulation to competition. Because
there has been little or no competition in these industries, the merging
firms may not have historically been competitors. As a consequence,
antitrust standards, which are designed largely to measure the impact on
competition from the loss of existing competition between the merging
firms, make it difficult to challenge mergers that threaten to diminish
future competition. This point was made by Joel Klein, the former
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, in a speech at FERC in 1998:
To be specific about electricity, there is nowhere in the United States
today that can we observe a fully restructured market in actual
operation, and, in large parts of the country, we have little idea, for
example, of what the basic nature of transmission pricing will be.
This lack of experience presents practical analytic challenges for us.
For example, the paradigm of the Merger Guidelines requires us to
examine the effects of a five or ten percent increase by a hypothetical
monopolist above levels likely to prevail in the near future. In almost
all cases, currently prevailing prices provide the best indication of
prices in the near future,9 and they are used as the benchmark for
analyzing price increases.

8. See, e.g., AEP Power Marketing, Inc., Order on Triennial Market Power Updates and
Announcing New, Interim Generation Market Power Screen and Migration Policy, FERC Docket
No. ER96-2495-015, 97 F.E.R.C. T 61,219, 2001 FERC LEXIS 2788 (2001).
9. Joel I. Klein, Making the Transition from Regulation to Competition: Thinking About
Merger Policy During the Process of Electric Power Restructuring, Address Before the FERC
(Jan. 21, 1998), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1332.htm.
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It is undeniable that it is more difficult for the government to prevail
in merger challenges under the Clayton Act. Long gone are the days
of antitrust merger jurisprudence was "the
when the guiding principle
10
government always wins."
As a result of the difficulty of challenging electricity mergers under
the Clayton Act, it is argued that the public interest standard, which as
explained earlier places the burden on merger applicants, is more
appropriate for the electricity industry. This standard gives government
regulators much more flexibility than the Clayton Act to protect
potential competition because the public interest test is not limited to
antitrust principles. As the First Circuit explained in Northeast Utilities
v. FERC:
Although the Commission must include antitrust considerations in its
public interest calculus under the [Federal Power Act], it is not bound
to use antitrust principles when they may be inconsistent with the
Commission's regulatory goals .... [I]ndiscriminate incorporation of
antitrust policy into utility regulation "could 'l undercut the very
objectives the antitrust laws are designed to serve."
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST SHARED JURISDICTION
Critics of FERC merger review authority make several arguments.
The most effective argument, in my view, against shared jurisdiction is
that FERC does not possess the necessary expertise to review mergers.
Although FERC clearly has superior knowledge of the electric power
industry when compared to either of the federal antitrust agencies,
FERC is not an antitrust agency. Investigating the likely competitive
effects of proposed mergers requires a different set of skills than
regulating rates. As a consequence, critics contend, FERC's lack of
antitrust expertise may result in the agency blocking procompetitive
mergers or failing to challenge anticompetitive transactions.
The antitrust agencies, on the other hand, review mergers in every
segment of the American economy, including industries that were
previously subjected to pervasive regulation, such as airlines and
telecommunications. The agencies can compensate for their relative
lack of industry expertise by consulting with FERC staff during the
course of a merger investigation. Indeed, the federal antitrust agencies
commonly confer with sectoral regulators in connection with mergers
involving the regulators' areas of expertise.
10. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
11. Northeast Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 993 F.2d 937, 947 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Town of
Concord, Mass. v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1990)).

2002]

DOJ, FTC and FERC Electric Power Merger Enforcement

789

In addition, critics contend, overlapping merger review imposes upon
parties to a transaction additional costs and delay. Obtaining
government approval of a transaction can be a costly proposition, which
becomes even more costly when the transaction is subject to review by
multiple agencies. In addition to attorneys' fees that are incurred as a
result of having to respond to separate inquiries from the FERC and
either the DOJ or FTC, shared jurisdiction imposes indirect costs such
as the drain on company executives' time and productivity.
Finally, opponents of shared jurisdiction are concerned about the use
of the public interest standard to evaluate mergers. As I stated earlier,
the public interest standard is broader than the Clayton Act. How much
broader is unclear. This uncertainty raises concerns that the public
interest test may be too broad and lacks standards, which may result in
the FERC having the ability to block any merger that it deems to be
contrary to the public interest with few apparent limitations.
V.

CONCLUSION

I believe that critics of shared enforcement have the stronger
argument. Overlapping merger review assumes that the federal antitrust
agencies are not fully capable of reviewing mergers in this sector or that
the antitrust laws are inadequate, or both. Neither statement is true.
The antitrust agencies are staffed with well-respected attorneys and
economists who have years of experience in the electric power industry.
And contrary to the concerns expressed regarding the "difficulty" of
challenging mergers under the Clayton Act, the government has a fairly
impressive record in recent years of successful challenges of alleged
anticompetitive transactions in the electric power industry 12 as well as
other network industries. 13 In my view, the benefits of shared
jurisdiction simply do not outweigh the costs.

12. See, e.g., United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.C. 2000) (electric/gas
merger).
13. See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. WorldCom & Sprint Corp., (filed June 27, 2000),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f5OOO/5051.htm (telecommunications); Press
Release, Department of Justice, Department of Justice and Several States Will Sue to Stop United
Airlines from Acquiring US Airways (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2001/July/361 at.htm (airlines).

